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COMMENTAIRES 
SHADOWS OVER ARBITRATION 
H. D. WOODS 
The author présents what he believes to be an excessive 
dose of public intervention in the relationship between 
labour and management and more particularly in the field 
of arbitration. 
A meeting of the National Academy of Arbitrators in Toronto 
justifies a closer look at Canadian policy and expérience in industrial 
relations than is usually undertaken in thèse sessions. This is in no way 
to be taken as a criticism of either earlier programs or program 
committees, the former of which are worthy of praise and the latter of 
commendation. But Canadian experiments in public policy in labour 
relations hâve certain unique characteristics which are perhaps not too 
well known and understood in the United States by practitioners of the 
art of arbitration, and even by some scholars who hâve taken an 
analytical approach to the work of the trade. An examination of a 
foreign industrial relations System reveals truths about that System and 
serves to put into better perspective the more familiar industrial relations 
system of the home territory of the investigator. Particularly it forces 
récognition and re-examination of inarticulate premises which lurk in the 
background but are seldom challenged until international comparisons 
expose them to view. In my own expérience, the more I learned 
about the industrial relations Systems of the United States and one or 
two underdeveloped countries in which I worked, the more I was 
forced to question the validity of unchallenged assumptions upon which 
the Canadian system was constructed. With this in mind, I propose 
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to look at some important Canadian experiments in public policy 
regarding arbitration. 
Canadian authorities hâve shown a marked pre-occupation with 
industrial peace as a goal, and there are important Canadian innovations 
in législative control of industrial relations. Indeed of the eleven political 
jurisdictions, the ten provinces and the fédéral authority, only one, 
Saskatchewan, has a légal system which is in most respects similar to 
that of the United States. Ail the other jurisdictions hâve departed 
from the American model by the imposition of compulsory conciliation 
of negotiation or interest disputes, and by a prohibition by law of the 
work stoppage during the term of an agreement, coupled with a légal 
requirement to refer unresolved disputes to arbitration if necessary. 
My thesis is that while Canadian unions and management appear 
to be operating under an arbitration system very similar to that of the 
United States, in fact they are carrying out the requirements of the law, 
whereas in the United States the parties engage in arbitration because 
they hâve agreed to do so for the resolution of disputes arising under 
the agreement they hâve negotiated. In the United States, the arbitration 
clause is the instrument of enforcement of the agreement and is a substi-
tute for the work stoppage. This fundamental différence is not usually 
revealed in collective agreements. Usually American agreements do 
contain no-strike and no-lockout clauses. So do Canadian agreements. 
Usually American agreements contain a grievance procédure and a 
provision for arbitration of unresolved grievance disputes. The same is 
true of Canadian agreements. In other words, on the face of it Canadian 
and American agreements appear to make the same provisions for 
dealing with disputes arising during the life of an agreement concerning 
its interprétation or application. But there is the very important dif-
férence that in the Canadian case thèse provisions are required by law 
and in the American case they are the resuit of voluntarism. It is my 
contention that this différence is a significant one ; that it has influenced 
the tone and character of arbitration, and that the process of collective 
bargaining has also been affected. Finally I believe that because arbitra-
tion is a statutory requirement, résistance to an extension of state 
intervention has been weakened in Canada, and certain trends in public 
policy suggest that arbitration as an instrument for the resolution of 
disputes arising during the term of an agreement is slipping out of the 
hands of the contracting parties and into the hands of state agencies. 
It is difficult to prove this thesis, and in a sensé I am opening up an 
area for further research which seems to be needed. But an examination 
of the législative provisions for labour arbitration in Canada is a first step 
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toward an understanding of the course of public policy in contract 
dispute resolution. 
In a luncheon address a lot of history is intolérable, a modest 
amount can be boring, but a little may be necessary, and I hope, can be 
interesting. As early as 1903 the Canadian fédéral government, following 
a disturbing railway strike, introduced a compulsory arbitration bill 
applicable to railway disputes.l At that time the Trades and Labour 
Congress of Canada and some of the unions were supporting the principle 
of compulsory arbitration. Under pressure from the international railway 
unions, and the influence of the American Fédération of Labor, Parlia-
ment removed compulsory arbitration from the law and it emerged as 
a compulsory concilation act. In 1907 the Industrial Disputes Investiga-
tion Act2 imposed both compulsory conciliation boards and a suspension 
of the strike, or a cooling-off period on the parties in disputes in public 
utilities and mines. 
While this was a fédéral law, because of the uncertainty at the 
time regarding provincial and fédéral jurisdictions, it was applied without 
distinction in utilities and mines. The uncertainty was removed in 1923 
by a ruling of the Privy Council in Britain,3 at that time still the final 
court of appeal in Canadian cases. The basis of the présent balkanization 
of Canadian labour relations jurisdictions was laid. The fédéral govern-
ment's jurisdiction was reduced to a very limited coverage and the 
provincial sway over the entire manufacturing, mining, commercial, and 
construction sectors was confirmed. 
The period of the 1930's saw the rise of « Wagnerism» in the United 
States and the arrivai of gênerai required récognition of unions, and 
compulsory collective bargaining in that country. Canada was slow to 
follow, although a number of provinces in 1937, under pressure from the 
unions, introduced weak versions of the Wagner Act, usually without 
enforcement machinery such as labour relations boards. 
The second world war led to at least three major changes in Cana-
dian industrial relations policy. First, under the emergency powers in 
the British North America Act, the document in Canada which passes 
for a written constitution, authority shifted to the fédéral government 
away from the provinces. Secondly, the Wagner principle of compulsory 
1
 Railway Labour Disputes Act, 1903. 
2
 Full Title — An Act to Aid in the Prévention and Seulement of Strike s and 
Lockouts in Mines and Industries Connected with Public Utilities. 
3
 Toronto Electric Commissioners v. Snider, Appeal Cases, 1925. 
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récognition and collective bargaining was imported from the United 
States and combined with the existing compulsory conciliation. Finally, 
compulsory arbitration of disputes arising during the life of an agreement 
was incorporated into the law. 
In 1943 British Columbia's rather anaemic Industrial Conciliation 
and Arbitration Act of 1937 was beefed up by compelling récognition 
and collective bargaining. It also imposed a complicated form of com-
pulsory conciliation during negotiations. In the same year Ontario4 
introduced Wagner principles, provided for certification, and established 
a labour court to carry out the functions normally associated with a 
labour relations board. It was the first administrative body in Canada 
charged with the enforcement of broadly conceived labour law. 
The third change, and the one of particular interest to arbitrators, 
was the introduction of compulsory arbitration of grievance disputes. 
As early as 1940 in a policy document5 the fédéral government issued a 
statement of intent. In this it was stated that every collective agreement 
should provide machinery for the settlement of disputes arising out of 
the agreement, and for its renewal or revision. But while this policy 
was not enforceable, it became so in 1944 when the Canadian govern-
ment finally got around to establishing a gênerai war-time labour rela-
tions policy.6 Thus, ail three major policy changes were brought 
together. The System was centralized and unified under fédéral control ; 
the Canadian system of compulsory conciliation and suspension of the 
strike was combined with the American System of compulsory collective 
bargaining; and arbitration of grievance disputes was imposed by law. 
This was the essence of the system for the rest of the war and 
post-war emergency period. The fédéral government's spécial authority, 
however, expired with the end of the emergency and the provinces 
wasted no time moving in to fill the vacuum. And it is interesting to note 
that ail jurisdictions retained as a basic structure the Wagner Act 
system which had corne to Canada as a war-time measure. But that 
was the extent of complète uniformity continuing into the 1950's. How-
ever, two other war-time experiments were continued by ail jurisdiction 
but Saskatchewan. Thèse were compulsory conciliation boards for 
negotiation disputes and, of spécial interest to the members of the 
Academy, compulsory arbitration of disputes arising during the term of 
an agreement. So the experiment of compulsory arbitration of rights 
4
 Ontario Collective Bargaining Act, 1943. 
s
 Privy Council Order, 2685, 1940. 
6 
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disputes was confirmed in the post-war statutes of nine provincial 
législatures and of the Parliament of Canada. 
I now turn briefly to look at some of the provisions for arbitration 
which were introduced, and especially at variations from one jurisdiction 
to another. 
Saskatchewan is the only jurisdiction which did not introduce 
compulsory arbitration of disputes arising during the term of an agree-
ment. However, it did include a statutory arbitration procédure7 which 
applies in those cases where the parties hâve agreed to arbitrate but 
hâve not provided for an arbitration procédure of their own design. In 
other words, the law helps to guarantee that an agreement to arbitrate 
shall be carried out where the parties are in default. 
More commonly in Canadian jurisdictions strikes and lockouts are 
prohibited during the term of an agreement. Three provinces, Ontario,8 
Alberta,9, and British Columbia10 make this absolute. 
A slightly modified policy is found in the fédéral law,11 which 
contains the same provisions banning the strike or lockout during the 
life of an agreement, but permitting the parties to include in an agreement 
a provision that any clause in the agreement may be identified as one 
that may be re-opened. If it is re-opened the work stoppage is available 
to the parties, but only after the legally required steps in conciliation 
hâve been taken. Similar arrangements are found in Manitoba,12 New-
foundland,13 New Brunswick14 and Prince Edward Island.15 
Considering that this opting-out procédure is applicable only to 
cases where the partie hâve agreed to a re-opener, it is not surprising 
that it has hardly ever been used. In a practical way the légal ban on 
strikes or lockouts during the term of an agreement is more or less 
complète. 
Thus, in Canadian law the grievance strike or lockout cease to be 
bargainable issues. But what about the other half of the industrial peace 
7
 Saskatchewan Trade Union Act, Section 26(1). 
8
 Ontario Labour Relations Act, Section 63(1), 63(2), 65 & 67. 
9
 Alberta Labour Act, Section 73(3). 
10
 British Columbia Labour Relations Act, Section 2(1). 
11
 Canada Labour Code, Sections 147(2), 163, 164, & 180. 
12
 Manitoba Labour Relations Act, Section 52(3). 
13
 Newfoundland Labour Relations Act, Section 52(3). 
14
 New Brusnwick Industrial Relations Act, Section 92(3). 
15
 Prince Edward Island Industrial Relations Act, Section 39(2). 
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équation, grievance arbitration? This also has been removed from the 
bargaining table except as to the form, and even that is, at least in some 
jurisdictions, an endangered species. 
The Ontario law provides that : 
« Every collective agreement shall provide for the final and binding 
seulement by arbitration, without stoppages of work, of ail différ-
ences between the parties arising from the interprétation, applica-
tion, administration or alleged violation of the agreement, including 
any question as to whether a matter is arbitrable. » 16 
This clause reinforces the ban on the strike and lockout, imposes 
arbitration, describes in gênerai terms the scope of the arbitrator's 
jurisdiction and allocates to the arbitrator the power to décide on 
arbitrability. It does leave to the parties the form of arbitration itself. 
Thus the parties may use a single ad hoc arbitrator, a permanent 
umpire, a three-man board, or any other form they can agrée to. 
But there are other features of the law that deserve our attention. 
A weakness of any System which imposes compulsory arbitration is the 
problem arising if the parties fail to do what the law requires and do 
not write an arbitration clause. Ontario has met this problem by a statutory 
arbitration clause which is deemed to be included in any collective 
agreement which contains no arbitration clause designed by the parties 
in their negotiations.17 
The effect of this and other provisions is that every collective 
agreement in Ontario has an arbitration provision even if the parties 
never mentioned arbitration in their negotiations. As might be expected, 
the statutory clause is a complex one which authorizes either party to 
initiate an arbitration proceeding; requires each to name a member; calls 
on thèse members to agrée on a neutral chairman; empov/ers the 
minister of labour on request by either party to act by naming a 
member if a party is in default in appointment ; or if the two nominees 
fail to agrée on a neutral chairman, to name the chairman. It also 
authorizes the Labour Relations Board to amend the procédures of the 
negotiated arbitration clause, or of the statutory clause if deemed by 
the Board to be inadéquate. 
Several other jurisdictions hâve adopted policies very similar to 
that of Ontario although there are some variations in the législation from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Only a few of thèse variations need to be 
16
 Ontario Labour Relations Act, Section 82(1). 
17
 Ibid., Section 82(2), (3), (4). 
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mentioned. A few provinces grant the parties the choice of settling 
grievance disputes «by arbitration or otherwise».18 There has been 
much spéculation on the meaning of the word « otherwise ». Nova Scotia 
has a spécial provision for grievance arbitration in the construction 
industry. It provides for very rapid action under a single arbitrator 
chosen by the parties or imposed in default, by the minister of labour.19 
Thèse are illustrations. They are found again and again in most of 
the country and they reveal the extent to which grievance arbitration 
has corne under statutory control in gênerai in Canada. But there are 
a few other illustrations of experiments which are in existence in only 
or a very few jurisdictions. Since some of thèse may be indications of 
future trends they must be considered. 
The Nova Scotia imposition of a single arbitrator in the construction 
industry contracts has already been mentioned. A similar provision for 
a single arbitrator is imposed in the Québec construction industry, but 
the law requires that the arbitrator shall be chosen at the time of 
negotiation of the agreement, failing which a state agency will name 
him.20 Ontario has gone further21. Notwithstanding any provisions in 
construction industry agreements for disposing of grievances, either party 
may refer any dispute concerning the interprétation, application, ad-
ministration or alleged violation of the agreement, to the Labour 
Relations Board for final and binding seulement. The Board is authorized 
to appoint a labour relations officer who attempts to médiate the dispute. 
But the Board also has the authority to arbitrate the case itself. 
Intervention by the state into the process of grievance dispute 
resolution has been greatest in British Columbia as a brief examination 
of that province's unique experiments will reveal. To begin with an 
arbitrator or arbitration board « shall... hâve regard to the real substance 
of the matters in dispute and the respective merit of the positions of 
the parties there to under the terms of the collective agreement, and 
shall apply principles consistent with the industrial relations policy of 
this Act, and is not bound by a strict légal interprétation of the issue 
in dispute.»22 
Hère the statute not only establishes arbitration as a légal require-
ment, but it also provides the arbitrator with the principles which 
18
 New Brunswick Industrial Relations Act, Section 55(1). 
19
 Nova Scotia Trade Union Act, Section 103. 
20
 Québec Construction Industry Labour Relations Act, Section 30. 
21
 Ontario Labour Relations Act, Section 112a. 
22
 British Columbia Labour Code, Section 92(3). 
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should be applied in his decision-making. Included in thèse is the 
industrial relations policy of the Act. In a sensé the arbitrator is 
forced to interpret the law as well as the agreement. Presumably the 
law and its principles would take precedence over the agreement in case 
of conflict in industrial relations policy between the agreement and the 
Labour Code of British Columbia. 
The same law imposes on the parties and their arbitrator the 
pnnciple of just cause in dismissal or discipline cases.23 It reads in 
part as follows : 
«Every collective agreement shall contain a provision governing 
dismissal or discipline of an employée bound by the agreement and 
that provision, or another provision, shall require that the employer 
hâve a just and reasonable cause for the dismissal or discipline or 
an employée... » 
An opting out provision is available to the parties by agreement, for 
probationers. 
Again I suggest the arbitrator is forced to interpret a statute. I am 
not a member of the légal fraternity, but I would fear that such a provi-
sion will encourage judges to hear appeals from arbitration awards on 
the merits. 
Another clause in the law24 in effect establishes the Labour 
Relations Board as a labour court to hear and décide grievance 
disputes under an agreement. Either party, prior to the actual appoint-
ment of an arbitrator, may request the Labour Relations Board to 
appoint an officer to confer with the parties to assist them to settle 
différences, and the Board has the choices of appointing such an officer, 
declaring that the case is arbitrable, referring the différence back to the 
parties for arbitration, or acting as an arbitration board itself. However, 
the parties to an agreement may jointly opt out of this légal provision. 
In practice this is a system of médiation and arbitration and is very 
similar to the provision in the Ontario law for the re solution of grievance s 
in construction. 
The British Columbia Act goes further:25 
« Where a différence arises during the term of a collective agreement, 
and, in the opinion of the board, delay has occurred in settling the 
différence, or the différence is a source of industrial unrest between 
23
 Ibid., Section 93(1). 
24
 Ibid., Section 96. 
25
 Ibid., Section 97 & 98. 
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the parties, the board may, on the application of either party to the 
différence, or on its own motion, inquire into the différence, and 
make recommendations for seulement and, where the différence 
is arbitrable, order that it be immediately submitted to a spécifie 
stage or step in the grievance procédure provided under the collective 
agreement; or, whether the différence is arbitrable or not, request 
the minister to appoint a spécial officer. 
«...an arbitration board has ail the authority necessary to provide 
a final and conclusive seulement of a dispute arising under the 
provisions of a collective agreement, and, without limiting the gêner-
ai ity of the foregoing, has authority; 
(a) to make an order fixing and determining the monetary value of 
any injury or loss suffered by an employer, trade-union, or any other 
person as a resuit of a contravention of a collective agreement, and 
directing an employer, trade-union, or other person to pay to an 
employer, trade-union, or other person ail or part of the amount of 
the monetary value of the injury or loss as fixed and determined 
by the board, 
(b) to make an order directing an employer to reinstate an employée 
dismissed under circumstances constituting a contravention of a 
collective agreement, 
(c) to make an order directing an employer or trade-union to rescind 
and rectify any disciplinary action taken in respect of an employée 
that was imposed under circumstances constituting a contravention 
of a collective agreement, 
(d) to détermine that a dismissal or discipline is excessive in ail 
the circumstances of the case and substitute such other measures as 
appears just and équitable, 
(e) to relieve, on such terms as may be just and reasonable, 
against any breaches of time limits or other procédural requirements 
set out in the collective agreement, 
(f) to dismiss or reject an application or grievance, or refuse to 
settle a différence, where, in the opinion of the arbitration board, 
there has been unreasonable delay by the person bringing the 
application or grievance, or requesting the seulement, and the delay 
has operated to the préjudice or détriment of the other party to the 
différence, and 
(g) to interpret and apply any Act intended to regulate the employ-
aient relationship of the persons bound by a collective agreement 
notwithstanding that its provisions conflict with the terms of the 
collective agreement. » 
It does not require a detailed examination of this unusual législation 
to realize that the parties in collective bargaining in British Columbia 
hâve largely lost control of arbitration. 
The reason advanced for this experiment in med-arb involving an 
officer and the Labour Relations Board as well as arbitrators chosen 
by the parties is the dissatisfaction with arbitration exprèssed by the 
parties. The unions especially were legitimately unhappy about the 
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excessive costs, the agonizing delays and in some cases poor quality 
of arbitration. Resolution by this public System has certainly reduced 
the cost since much of this is borne by the public. Undoubtedly the 
system is popular with the parties. In the first full year of opération (1964) 
126 applications were made, 87 of thèse were settled by the officer, 29 
resulted in orders by the Labour Relations Board, 7 were referred 
back to the parties for conventional arbitration and 3 were declared not 
arbitrable. I understand that in the last reporting year around 700 
applications were filed and that the proportions of seulement by the 
officer, by Board ruling, by referral back to the parties, and by déclaration 
of non-arbitrability hâve remained much the same. 
This looks like success, and statistically on its face it is. But one 
must ask what may be the impact on collective bargaining and the 
relationship of the parties. If sixty to seventy per cent of the cases are 
settled by agreement through the intervention of an officer, it is legitimate 
to ask what is wrong with collective bargaining that most of thèse issues 
were not resolved in the grievance procédure where they should 
hâve been settled. Are the parties guilty of abdication of their responsib-
ilities and are they protecting themselves by the med-arb system? Are 
frivolous cases going on the docket because this is the easy and relatively 
inexpensive way to avoid the hard décision ? Finally are we not observing 
one of the fruits of compulsory arbitration of grievance disputes ? Thèse 
are legitimate questions to which I do not hâve the answers. But 
regardless, I express some concern about a system which has narrowed 
to a considérable extent the range of decision-making and freedom of 
the parties. 
There are other Canadian experiments with arbitration which might 
be examined but time is limited. There is, for example, the system of 
adjudication (the term used in place of arbitration) of rights disputes 
under the Fédéral Public Service Staff Relations Act, in which arbitrators 
are appointed in accordance with statutory requirements from a limited 
list established under the Act, and in which the parties hâve no control 
over either the adjudicators or the adjudication process. But this is a 
spécial case of public sector employment which may hâve its own 
peculiarities which make the usual employer and union prérogatives 
inoperative. I withhold judgement. 
But there is one more experiment which flows directly from the 
compulsory arbitration and no work-stoppage policy of Canadian législa-
tion which is worth exploring. I refer to the redundancy problem 
related to industrial conversion or technological change. Because the 
law prohibits work stoppages during the term of an agreement, and 
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imposes arbitration for rights disputes arising during this closed period, 
the parties may be locked into an agreement when change is creating 
serious fears and tensions which, because there is no legitimate way 
to renegotiate the terms of the agreement, may lead to wildcat strikes 
and other disruptions. Several Canadian jurisdictions hâve attempted to 
résolve this problem by an awkward procédure of re-opening the agree-
ment under certain circumstances. Since the Manitoba provision is 
perhaps the most extrême I will use it as an illustration.26 Briefly an 
employer bound by a collective agreement is required to give 90 days 
notice of any proposed technological change that is likely to affect the 
terms and conditions, or the security, of employment of a significant 
number of employées in the unit or to alter significantly the basis upon 
which the agreement was negotiated. This notice in writing to the 
bargaining agent must state the nature of the proposed change, the 
proposed date, the approximate number and type of employées likely 
to be affected, and the effect the change is likely to hâve on the terms 
and conditions, or security, of employment or the altération that is 
likely to be made to the basis upon which the agreement was negotiated. 
Such a notice opens the door to a union request for bargaining and 
provides for the termination of the agreement either at the expiry date 
or 90 days after the employer notice, whichever is the earlier. However, 
an employer may submit to arbitration the question of a significant 
number who may be affected, or whether the proposed changes will 
alter significantly the basis of the collective agreement. 
I am not sure whether an arbitrator confronted with this kind of 
sooth-saying should indulge in prayer or coin tossing. I do suggest, 
however, that a simpler solution might hâve been to repeal both the 
prohibition on the work stoppage and the imposition of rights dispute 
arbitration. Surely the bargaining table is the appropriate forum for the 
battle over management's degree of responsibility in the technological 
change and redundancy issue. Historically this issue has been the cause 
of some very bitter controversy in Canada. I suspect it might hâve been 
more successfully handled had the process not been constrained by 
compulsory arbitration features of the law, with the questions of the 
work stoppage and redundancy both being on the bargaining table. 
More illustrations of extensive public intervention in the arbitration 
process could be recited. But those already noted indicate that much 
of the innovation in arbitration procédure in Canada is the resuit of state 
Manitoba Labour Relations Act, Section 72, 73 & 74. 
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action. This public présence was noted by the Fédéral Task Force on 
Labour Relations in 1969.27 
Conventional wisdom in the United States looks upon the arbitra-
tion of grievances as an action in a bilatéral system of industrial relations. 
The parties may use it or not depending on the agreement they reach. 
But in Canada the industrial relations system has much more of a multi-
latéral character. The state has intruded into the process much more than 
in the United States. The law requires industrial peace after an agree-
ment has been signed. The law requires arbitration to préserve the 
peace. In some jurisdictions statutory law lays down the procédures of 
arbitration and even includes the principles and public policies which 
must be respected by the arbitrators and the parties. The Canadian 
industrial relations system features a high degree of employer détermina-
tion, trade union participation, collective bargaining and government 
involvement in a number of capacities. 
I do not propose to go back in an euphorie and nostalgie trip to the 
sentiments of the early greats among the arbitrators such as Taylor, 
Witte, Shulman, and others. Times hâve changed and so has arbitration, 
yet certain basic approaches may hâve lasting merit. A Canadian member 
of the Academy in 1970 spoke as foliows : 
« Surely the proper way for continued development is to hâve more 
work done by the partisan parties in arbitration. The genius of the 
system has always been its consensual nature and the fact that the 
parties agreed together on the decision-maker and the process which 
brought the dispute to him. »28 
It seems to me that public policy and régulation in Canada are 
inexorably undermining the position of management and labour in both 
the freedom of choice of arbitrators and control of the process itself. 
Canadian unions and employers hâve ne ver shown much évidence of the 
innovative expérimentation of their American counterparts in devising 
new and better forms of arbitration. My thesis is that compulsions 
coming out of the second world war period are partly responsible. 
But intervention is like an exothermic chemical reaction — once started 
it fuels itself. Over ail hangs the shadow of arbitration courts. 
Let me close with an apology. This paper could leave the impression 
that I hâve corne to certain conclusions which are critical of the 
27
 Canadian Industrial Relations, Report of the Task Force on Labour Relations, 
Ottawa Privy Council Office, 1969. 
28
 Earl Palmer, abridgement of a talk given to the Personnel Association of 
Toronto, Canadian Industrial Relations and Personnel Development, Toronto, March, 
1970, p. 6004. 
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Canadian approach to grievance arbitration and that I hâve not proven 
my case. That is correct. But my justification is that I wish to open up 
a controversy which has not yet excited the interest of research scholars. 
In doing so, I hâve indicated some impressions which expérience 
and observation hâve brought to my mind. If research should prove that 
I am right, Canadians should take another look at their experiments in 
state intervention in grievance arbitration. If, however, careful study 
should réfute my criticism, Americans might find it profitable to review 
their policies and indeed much of the revealed doctrine of labour relations 
in the private sector. 
L'INDUSTRIE QUÉBÉCOISE DE LA CONSTRUCTION ET 
SES PROBLÈMES 
GÉRARD HÉBERT 
Je me propose dans le présent exposé de toucher aux trois points 
suivants: 1. les structures de négociation dans la construction, 2. le rè-
glement du placement au Québec, et 3. la mobilité des travailleurs de la 
construction. 
LES STRUCTURES DE NÉGOCIATION 
La négociation par métier a toujours été et demeure pratique cou-
rante parmi vos unions. Elle correspond à une tradition séculaire, et elle 
* HÉBERT, G., professeur, École de relations industrielles, Université de 
Montréal. 
** Le secrétariat canadien du Département des métiers de la construction 
(F.A.T.-C.O.I.) a organisé, les 17 et 18 juillet derniers, un premier congrès canadien, 
qui réunissait les représentants des conseils provinciaux et régionaux des métiers de la 
construction ainsi que ceux des différentes unions internationales des métiers de la 
construction. 
Le congrès, qui doit se réunir tous les deux ans, parle au nom des 400,000 tra-
vailleurs canadiens de la construction. Le nouveau conseil canadien est composé d'un 
représentant international canadien de chacune des quinze unions et du secrétaire 
exécutif du Bureau canadien. Ils n'ont pas été élus, mais nommés par le président du 
Département des métiers de la construction (F.A.T.-C.O.I.). Le congrès était aussi 
présidé par le président du Département. 
Le professeur Hébert était l'un des quelques invités qui ont adressé la parole aux 
participants du congrès. 
